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AMERICAN INNOCENCE 
Robert N Strassfeld t 
"[I}t is unpleasant for Americans to see that some citizens, some soldiers 
have acted this way, because ... it doesn't reflect how we think. This is not 
America. "1 
What has distinguished our ancestors?-That they would not admit of tor-
tures, or cruel and barbarous punishment. But Congress may introduce 
the practice of the civil law, in preference to that of the common law. They 
may introduce the practice of France, Spain, and Gennany-of torturing, 
to extort a confession of the crime. They will say that they might as well 
draw examples from those countries as from Great Britain, and they will 
tell you that there is such a necessity of strengthening the arm of govern-
ment, that they must have a criminal equity, and extort confession by tor-
ture . ... We are then lost and undone. 2 
I. INTRODUCTION 
One of my earliest enduring memories of the Vietnam War is of tor-
ture. Thankfully, my memories come not from first-hand experiences, but 
from a photo essay published by Life Magazine in June 1964. Nevertheless, 
t Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University School of Law. My thanks to Beth 
Hillman, George Herring, Hiram Chodosh, Amos Guiora, and Ted Steinberg for helpful 
suggestions regarding this project. None of them have read a draft, so they really are blame-
less for any errors contained herein. My thanks also to Case School of Law for summer re-
search support and to the Frederick K. Cox International Law Center for sponsoring the 
symposium on 'Torture and the War on Terror" of which this is a part. For valuable research 
assistance I thank Christopher Borm and Victoria Marquard. I am also grateful for some 
translation help given to me by Takahiko Shibayama. I am deeply indebted to Spence Zaor-
ski for his translation of the section of Akihiko Okamura's book on Vietnam that deals with 
the events described in the Introduction to this article. I am especially grateful to Ms. Masako 
Okamura for her gracious efforts to find any of her brother-in-law Akihiko Okamura's un-
published photographs that might shed light on the incident described in his Life Magazine 
photo essay. This article is dedicated to the memory of Marla Ruzicka and Akihiko Okamura 
who risked so much, and in Marla Ruzicka's case made the ultimate sacrifice, to tell the truth 
about war. 
1 Interview by Alhurra Television with President George W. Bush, 40 WEEKLY CoMP. 
PREs. Doc. 786, 787 (May 10, 2004), http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?db 
name=2004_presidential_ documents&docid=pd1 Omy04_ txt-20.pdf. 
2 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE 
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA, 
IN 1787 447-48 (Jonathan Elliott ed., 2d ed. 1941) (1836) [hereinafter DEBATES] (quoting 
Patrick Henry). 
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the pictures and text produced memories that are vivid, powerful, and last-
ing. Under what would prove to be an overly optimistic title, A Little War, 
Far Away-And Very Ugly, the text and photographs presented a grim pic-
ture. 3 Japanese photojournalist Akihiko Okamura was unflinching in his 
depiction of the misery and death that he saw. 
A portion of the essay involved a combat mission of a South Viet-
namese ("Army of the Republican of VietNam" or "ARVN") military unit 
near the Cambodian border. After a helicopter bombardment of a South 
Vietnamese village, the ARVN soldiers were airlifted to the village, where 
they met no resistance. 4 Initially fmding only women, children, and older 
men, they eventually flushed out forty-three military-aged men, whom they 
assumed to be guerillas. 5 Over Okamura's protests, hours of interrogation 
followed. 6 The text and Okamura's photographs depict ARVN soldiers 
beating and kicking the "guerillas."7 They placed the prisoners in uncom-
fortable stress positions: they were ''jackknifed into positions of agony."8 
The AR VN soldiers also employed various water torture techniques. They 
held prisoners under water in the nearby river, or put rags on the prisoners' 
faces and then poured water on the rags to create the sensation of drown-
ing. 9 Elsewhere Okamura described the torture in greater detail and the ac-
count is, as one would expect, chilling and disturbing. 10 Okamura did not 
3 A Little War, Far Away-And Ve1y Ugly, LIFE, June 12, 1964, at 34 [hereinafter LIFE] 
(photographed by Akihiko Okamura). 
4 !d. at 39. 
!d. 
!d. 
7 !d. 
!d. 
9 !d. 
10 See AKnm<.o OKAMURA, MINAMI VETONAMU SENSO JUGUNK.I: ZEN {1990) {Japan). 
Okamura recounts, for instance: 
Drenched clothes cling to the body of a young peasant villager of only 18 or 19 
years-old who has been forced down to the ground and is lying face up with his 
hands bound behind his back. He can't breathe. His nose and mouth twitch convul-
sively under a cloth gag. A government soldier trickles water over his face. A 
strained scream comes from deep within the villager's throat as he struggles to 
move his lower body to escape the life-threatening torture with his legs kicking 
towards the upper body of the soldier. "He's a big one! Hold him down. He's too 
strong for us. Use the pole to choke him!" An officer standing next to them with a 
military map in his left hand and a bamboo cane in his right hand gives detailed or-
ders. This Catholic c~ptain, who came from the North to the South after the Ge-
neva Accords were signed, maintains a stoic expression on his face while looking 
down at his captured prey .... 
The torture continues for over an hour under the broiling srm. An experienced non-
commissioned officer squats down near the ear of the villager who can hardly 
breathe. The villager's face is hidden by the cloth covering it. I wonder how the 
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have the benefit of the Bybee Memorandum, 11 of recent U.S. Department of 
Defense memoranda delineating permissible interrogation techniques, 12 nor 
of Central Intelligence Agency ("CIA") Director Porter Goss' assurance that 
such techniques are merely "professional interrogation." 13 Thus unenlight-
ened, Okamura had no trouble recognizing the acts he photographed as "tor-
tur ,14 e. 
As a nine-year old, waiting in my pediatrician's office for an allergy 
shot to help me cope with asthma, I focused especially on the water torture. 
I understood the panic that comes with the struggle to catch an adequate 
villager feels as he listens to the officer. "Come on, tell us. Where are the weapons 
hidden? Who is the Vietcong contact for this village?" However, the villager re-
mains silent. He replies by wriggling his body and trying to kick the soldiers. 
"Damn it! Arrgh!" Six soldiers spring like locusts and pin the villager down by his 
arms and legs. A pole that has been brought over is placed over the villager's soft 
throat. The officer gives an ultimatum to the villager, "Okay, if you don't talk, 
you're going to die!" Unable to bear any more, the villager's mother, who had been 
praying for her son in her home next door, rushes barefoot out to where her son is. 
A soldier holding a gun instantly responds and pushes the frail woman back into a 
corner of her home. 
Id. Spence Zaorski provided an English translation of a portion of Okamura's Japanese book 
especially for this article. 
11 Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, to 
Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, Re: Standards of Conduct for Interrogation 
under 18 U.S. C. §§ 2340-2340A (Aug. 1, 2002), reprinted in MARK DANNER, TORTURE AND 
TRUTH: AMERICA, ABU GHRAIB, AND THE WAR ON TERROR 115, 117-26 (2004) (hereinafter 
Bybee Memorandum]. 
12 Memorandum from Jerald Phifer, Dir, J2 to Michael E. Dunlavey, Commander, Joint 
Task Force 170, U.S. Dep't of Def., Request for Approval of Counter-Resistance Strategies 
(Oct. 11, 2001), reprinted in DANNER, supra note 11, at 167 (approving the "use of stress 
positions (like standing), for a maximum of four hours" and limiting, but not absolutely 
prohibiting the "[u]se of a wet towel and dripping water to induce the misperception of suf-
focation"); Memorandum from Diane E. Beaver, Staff Judge Advocate to Michael E. 
Dunlavey, Commander, Joint Task Force 170, U.S. Dep't of Def., Legal Brief on Proposed 
Counter-Resistance Strategies (Oct. 11, 2001), reprinted in DANNER, supra note 11, at 170, 
176-7 ("The use of a wet towel to induce the misperception of suffocation would also be 
permissible if not done with the specific intent to cause prolonged mental harm, and absent 
medical evidence that it would"); Memorandum from William J. Haynes ll, Gen. Counsel, 
U.S. Dep't of Def. to Donald Rumsfeld, Sec'y of Def., U.S. Dep't of Def., Counter-
Resistance Techniques (Nov. 27, 2002), reprinted in DANNER, supra note 11, at 181 (rec-
ommending that Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld approve the use of various interro-
gation techniques including stress positions, though not simulated suffocation with wet tow-
els). A reproduction of the Haynes memorandum, with Rumsfeld's approval and comment 
that "I stand for 8-10 hours a day. Why is standing limited to 4 hours?" is available at, 
http://www.humanrightsfrrst.org/us _law/etnlpdfldod-memos-120202.pdf (last visited Mar. 
23, 2006). 
13 Douglas Jehl, Questions Left By C.I.A. Chief on Torture Use, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 
2005, atAl. 
14 LIFE, supra note 3, at 38-39. 
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breath. Upon recently returning to the photographs, I find myself wondering 
about two questions that escaped my attention at the time. First, why was 
there no strong reaction to these photographs? There was hardly a ripple in 
the letters to the editor section in the weeks that followed. Second, and more 
important, though, perhaps, related, where are the Americans? 
May 1964, when the mission depicted occurred, was during what 
has come to be known as the advisory period of the war. America's military 
presence in South Vietnam was still relatively small. Officially, our in-
volvement was limited largely to the assistance of American advisors at-
tached to the ARVN forces. 15 Elsewhere in the essay, we learn about 
American advisors to ARVN forces. 16 We know that many ARv.N units at 
the time were accompanied by American advisors. 17 Did an American advi-
sor accompany the ARVN troops on this mission? If so, where was he when 
the torture began? Did he, as happened in so many veteran accounts from 
that war, go off to have a cigarette, or given the duration of the interroga-
tion, a pack of cigarettes, at the ARVN commander's suggestion? 18 We also 
know that the ARVN forces were transported to and from the village by 
helicopter. 19 At the time, while there were ARVN helicopter units in Viet-
nam, the likelihood that ARVN pilots rather than U.S. pilots were involved 
in the mission is remote, at best. 20 Did American helicopter pilots land from 
time to time during the interrogation to resupply the ARVN troops? We do 
know from Okamura's account of his experiences in Vietnam that after an 
unsuccessful interrogation, the forty-three prisoners were transported on 
American helicopters to a military area in the rear. 21 What did the American 
helicopter crews make of their beaten and damaged passengers and what of 
the reception that they met when deposited in the rear, doubtless for a con-
tinuation of their interrogation? Were they shocked by what they saw, or 
had they seen it all before? Certainly, the American officer who joined 
Okamura at the base camp's officer's club, where he tried to drink the im-
15 GEORGE C. HERRING, AMERICA'S LONGEST WAR: THE UNITED STATES AND VIETNAM, 
1950-1975 94-100, 130-33 (3d. ed. 1996). 
16 LrFE, supra note 3, at 40-44. 
17 HERRING, supra note 15, at 95-98. 
18 See, e.g., Robert Strassfe1d, The Vietnam War on Trial: The Court-Martial of Dr. How-
ard B. Levy, 1994 Wis. L. REv. 839, 915 (1994) (recounting the court-martial testimony of 
Donald Duncan and Robin Moore regarding the typical American response to acts of torture 
committed by their South Vietnamese counterparts). 
19 LiFE, supra note 3, at 39, 44a-44c. 
20 At the time, there were few South Vietnamese helicopter pilots, and they were poorly 
trained. Several U.S. Marine and Army helicopter units were in Vietnam for this sort of duty. 
My intuitions are shared by Professor George Herring who suggested that the most one 
would see in 1964 is an ARVN trainee flying with an American helicopter pilot. Conversa-
tion with George Herring, Professor Emeritus, Univ. of Ky. (Jan. 24, 2006). 
21 OKAMURA, supra note 10, at 228. 
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ages away later that night, did not seem surprised as he toasted Okamura's 
scoop and said: "War is meaningless."22 What, in other words, was the rela-
tionship between Americans in Vietnam and the practice of torture by 
ARVN forces? Was it awareness, accommodation, acquiescence, or encour-
agement? Did we see these acts as a beneficial evil? To what degree were 
we implicated in these acts? 
I do not know whether then young George W. Bush saw the photo-
graphs in Life Magazine, let alone what questions he may have pondered if 
he did. It seems unlikely to me that if he did see the pictures, he would have 
troubled himself much with the question: where are the Americans? After 
all, in response to publication of the Abu Ghraib photographs and accounts 
of prisoner abuse that went on there, he tried to reassure America and the 
world that "[t)his is not America."23 And, indeed, to varying degrees, I sus-
pect we all found ourselves thinking that-and would have been even more 
prone to think that way in 1964. 
It is useful to think about extraordinary rendition as part of a larger 
story about how Americans have seen their relationship to torture and to 
other wartime atrocity. That relationship, and our self-perception, has been 
complicated. Sometimes the ferocity of our rhetoric has been shocking, and 
we have been quite sanguine in embracing the brutality of war. At times, 
including, I believe, today, we have characterized the wars we fight as "sav-
age wars," fought against an enemy that we see as peculiarly barbaric and 
bent on extermination to whom, we say, we must respond in kind. 
More typically, however, we think of our relationship to torture and 
atrocity very differently. We have a hard time seeing ourselves in the pic-
tures from Abu Ghraib, or imagining ourselves as the perpetrators of torture, 
abuse, and other atrocities in the more hidden corners of the world that have 
not been penetrated by digital cameras. The grinning face of Lyndie Eng-
land, is not, we tell ourselves, the face of America. This flight from the un-
seemly side of American warfare is not new. The predominant theme in our 
thinking about our place in the world has been one of American exception-
alism and American innocence. 24 To be sure, this image is not an altogether 
flattering one. As I will suggest later on, "iimocence" connotes both blame-
lessness and naivete. Yet, I believe it is the more positive version of this 
22 Jd. 
23 Interview by Alhurra Television with President George W. Bush, supra note 1, at 787. 
24 One should, of course, venture cautiously when suggesting that Americans agree on a 
master narrative about ourselves. Surely, differences of gender, race, ethnicity, class, and 
experience militate against any consensus. Most recently, the divisions within the U.S. re-
garding the Iraq War suggest that a strong counter narrative exists. Nevertheless, with the 
caveat that these notions of American exceptionalism and American innocence do not enjoy 
unqualified universal acceptance, it is fair to say that these themes play a recurring role in 
how we have depicted ourselves in both popular culture and official proclamation. 
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image that we usually adopt, and in so doing, we cloud our self-perception, 
sometimes to the point of self-delusion. 
The sad fact is that our relationship to torture and other atrocities is 
more complicated and less innocent than we or President Bush would like to 
believe. This article examines that relationship and the ways in which we try 
to distance ourselves from torture and atrocity. Part II briefly explores our 
notions of exceptionalism and innocence. Part III then turns to our efforts to 
evade responsibility for torture and atrocity. First, it briefly discusses ways 
in which we try to deny our own acts of torture and abuse through rhetorical 
misdirection and by relegating torture to the shadows. Part III's primary 
focus, however, is on our practice of "othering" torture, and on extraordi-
nary rendition as an instantiation of that practice. The second portion of Part 
III looks at instances where we have taken advantage of a division of labor 
in which others act as our torturers, or at least torture with our knowledge 
and acquiescence, and it situates extraordinary rendition in that practice. 
Finally, it looks at some of the consequences of othering torture. Part IV 
takes up the theme of innocence, once again. It is commonplace to hear 
these days that America "lost its innocence" on September 11, 200 1. Part IV 
briefly examines this notion of loss of innocence. 
II. A NEW ADAM IN" A NEW WORLD 
Our age is retrospective. It builds the sepulchres of the fathers. It writes 
biographies, histories, and criticism. The foregoing generations beheld 
God and nature face to face; we, through their eyes. Why should not we 
also enjoy an original relation to the universe? ... [W] hy should we grope 
among the d1y bones of the past ? ... There are new lands, new men, new 
thoughts. Let us demand our own works and laws and worship. 25 
From early in our history, America has known war and the atro-
cious acts that accompany it. Those experiences have colored our under-
standing of ourselves in times of peace and war. So too, has our sense of 
America as a place for new beginnings, a new Eden. Both of these aspects 
of our collective self-image have contributed to the way we think about our 
relationship to torture and atrocity. 
As Richard Slatkin, Richard Drim1on, and John Hellmann have so 
ably described, we have often drawn on frontier myths, including myths of 
western gunfighters and "savage Indians," in understanding our confronta-
tion with other people and other parts of the world, especially when that 
confrontation is tinged with racial difference. 26 Confronted with an enemy 
25 Ralph Waldo Emerson, Nature, in SELECTED WRITINGS OF RALPH WALDO EMERSON 
186, 186-87 (William H. Gilman ed., 1965) (1836). 
26 See generally RICHARD DRINNON, FACING WEST: THE METAPHYSICS OF INDIAN-HATING 
AND EMPIRE-BUILDING (1980); JOHN HELLMANN, AMERICAN MYTH AND THE LEGACY OF 
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that we characterize as barbaric, we justify the waging of "savage war," a 
war whose ultimate logic is not merely defeat, but extermination of the en-
emy. 27 As John Dower has shown in his study of American images of the 
Japanese and Japanese images of Americans during WWII, there is much 
projection and self-justification at work when we employ these demonizing 
myths. 28 Confronted with a savage enemy in a non-traditional war, "a new 
kind of war" we are apt to say, though little is actually new, we look to the 
unconventional warrior (the frontier hero, or in his modem inception, Spe-
cial Forces and the CIA), the person who we say knows how to "fight[] like 
the Indians."29 
We have not always been squeamish about torture. In the aftermath 
of the Spanish-American War, American imperial aspirations ran into a 
nationalist insurrection in the newly-conquered Philippines. 3° Fueled by a 
cult of masculinity, Theodore Roosevelt's call for the strenuous life, and the 
desire for empire, many Americans embraced the use of torture and other 
atrocious acts. 31 Roosevelt explicitly linked the responsibility of Americans 
to the nation and to "the race" with the imperial program in Cuba, Hawaii, 
Puerto Rico, and the Philippines, and he derided "those who make a pre-
tense of humanitarianism to hide and cover their timidity, and who cant 
about 'liberty' and the 'consent of the governed,' in order to excuse them-
selves for their unwillingness to play the part ofmen."32 
Against this backdrop the rhetoric of pro-war advocates drew on the 
trope of "savage war" to justify extreme, brutal, and sometimes extennina-
VIETNAM (1986); RICHARD SLOTKIN, GUNFIGHTER NATION: THE MYTH OF THE FRONTIER JN 
TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA (1992) [hereinafter SLOTKIN, GUNFIGHTER NATION]; 
RICHARD SLOTKIN, REGENERATION THROUGH VIOLENCE: THE MYTHOLOGY OF THE AMERICAN 
FRONTIER, 1600-1860 (1973); RICHARD SLOTKIN, THE FATAL ENVIRONMENT: THE MYTH OF 
THE FRONTIER lN THE AGE OF lNDUSTRIALIZA TION 1800-1890 (1985). 
27 For a discussion of savage wars, see SLOTKIN, GUNFIGHTER NATION, supra note 26, at 
10-13, 106-22. On the Vietnam War as a savage war, see Strassfe1d, supra note 18, at 915-
21. 
28 See generally JOHN W. DOWER, WAR WITHOUT MERCY: RACE AND POWER IN THE 
PACIFIC W ARpassim (1986). 
29 Richard S1otkin, Gunfighters and Green Berets: The Magnificent Seven and the A1yth of 
Counter-Insurgency, 44 RADICALHIST. REv. 65,75 (1989). 
30 SLOTKIN, supra note 26, at 106-22. For a discussion of the United States' policy in the 
Philippines during this period, see generally LEON WOLFF, LITTLE BROWN BROTHER: How 
THE UNITED STATES PURCHASED AND PACIFIED THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS AT THE CENTURY'S 
TURN (1961). 
31 Stuart C. Miller, Our A1ylai of 1900: Americans in the Philippines Insurrection, 
TRANSACTION, Sept. 1970, at 19; SLOTKIN, supra note 26, at 106-22. 
32 Theodore Roosevelt, Speech before the Hamilton Club: The Strenuous Life (Apr. 10, 
1899), reprinted in THEODORE ROOSEVELT, THE STRENUOUS LIFE: ESSAYS AND ADDRESSES 18 
(1902). 
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tionist measures. The war correspondent for the Philadelphia Ledger, for 
instance, wrote: 
The present war is no bloodless, fake, opera bouffe [sic] engagement. Our 
men have been relentless; have killed to exterminate men, women, chil-
dren, prisoners and captives, active insurgents and suspected people, from 
lads of ten and up, an idea prevailing that the Filipino ... was little better 
than a dog .... Our soldiers have pumped salt water into men to "make 
them talk," have taken prisoner people who ... peacefully surrendered, 
and an hour later, without an atom of evidence to show that they were even 
insurrectos, stood them on a bridge and shot them down one by one, to ... 
float down as an example to those who found their bullet-riddled corpses .. 
. . It is not civilized warfare, but we are not dealing with civilized people. 
The only thing they know and fear is force, violence, and brutality, and we 
. . h 33 giVe 1t to t em. 
Taking the logic of savage war to its extreme, war correspondent 
Henry Loomis Nelson argued that the United States must set aside all 
qualms about cruelty or exterrnination.34 Loomis wrote: "We exterminated 
the American Indians, and I guess most of us are proud of it, or, at least, 
believe the end justified the means; and we must have no scruples about 
exterminating this other race standing in the way of progress and enlight-
enment if it is necessary."35 This tough-minded, bloodthirsty rhetoric trans-
lated into a brutal reality that included mass killings and torture. Thus, while 
Roosevelt publicly insisted that only insurgents committed atrocities in the 
Philippines, privately he welcomed the use of the "water cure, "36 that war's 
version of waterboarding. Public acknowledgment of our use of the water 
cure and other "inhuman conduct" came in William Howard Taft's testi-
mony to Congress on the conduct of the war. Then Governor-General of the 
Philippines, Taft excused these excesses as necessary components of what 
he deemed a war "between superior and inferior races."37 
In contrast to the claim to national adulthood as a world power, just 
as capable of brutality in the name of empire as our European rivals, we 
have often presented ourselves as free from the tyrannical tendencies and 
oppressive behaviors of Europe. Patrick Henry's statements at the Virginia 
ratifying convention, that he feared that we would adopt European practices 
33 SLOTKIN, GUNFIGHTER NATION, supra note 26, at 113 (quoting a correspondent of the 
Philadelphia Ledger). 
34 Id. at 112. 
35 SLOTKIN, GUNFIOHTERNATION, supra note 26, at 112 (quoting Henry Loomis Nelson). 
36 Id. at 120-21. 
37 Id. at 120. 
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of extracting confessions by torture and of inflicting "cruel and barbarous 
punishment" is but one expression of our collective sense of difference. 38 
Americans have long seen the American experience as one of new 
beginnings and an escape from the superstitions, prejudices, and practices of 
Europe. We have described the United States as a new Eden or a new Israel, 
and ourselves in Adamic terms. The American, in Crevecoeur's famous 
formulation, was a "new man, who acts upon new principles."39 The Ameri-
can was neither of the effete metropolis, nor of the frightening and uncivi-
lized (in Puritan descriptions, Satanic) wilderness. Rather he was a civiliz-
ing force in a new land, unblemished by the many faults of the old one. We 
have cultivated the contrast with Europe. We are a land with no castles or 
kings. In fleeing Europe, we left behind feudalism and aristocracy, the 
priestcraft and religious wars. With them, we also rejected the Star Cham-
ber, the rack and the thumbscrew. So, at least, goes part of our national 
myth. 
The power of this notion of American exceptionalism can be seen in 
its recurrence in our self-descriptions. During the American Renaissance of 
the 1840s and 1850s, such writers as Emerson and Whitman viewed the 
American in Adamic terms. 40 A century later, these images of the American 
Eden and of the American as a new man who had slipped the bonds and 
prejudices of Europe informed the consensus school of American history. 
Such historians as Daniel Boorstin, Louis Hartz, Richard Hofstadter, and 
David Potter, emphasized American difference and contended that our his-
tory was unlike Europe's. 41 The struggles that marked European history 
were largely missing in the United States, they argued, because class 
boundaries were fluid and class distinctions were of minor import, because 
ours was a nation of relative wealth, because there. was a broad consensus 
on basic democratic principles, eliminating the need for many of the epoch 
struggles in the European past, and because political differences were con-
fined to narrow manageable issues, not the sorts of things over which people 
would take to the streets and erect barricades, never mind engage in a reign 
of terror. Reacting to our encounter with European fascism and commu-
nism, and to our Cold War anxieties, some of their contemporaries hope-
fully and prematurely proclaimed "the end of ideology," just as their intel-
lectual descendants would be moved to announce the "end of history"-
38 DEBATES, supra note 2, at 447. 
39 J. HECTOR ST. JOHN CREVECOUER, LEITERS FROM AN AMERICAN FARMER 50 (Doubleday 
1963) (1782). 
40 See generally R.W.B. LEWIS, THE AMERICAN ADAM 13-53 (1955). 
41 Representative works include, DANIEL J. BOORSTIN, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN POLITICS 
(1953); LOUlS HARTZ, THE LIBERAL TRADITION IN AMERICA (1955); RICHARD HOFSTADTER, 
THE AMERICAN POLITICAL TRADITION AND THE MEN WHO MADE IT (1948); DAVID M. 
POTTER, PEOPLE OF PLENTY: ECONOMIC ABUNDANCE AND THE AMERICAN CHARACTER (1954). 
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equally prematurely.42 And, of course, notions of American exceptionalism 
are very much at the core of our current approach to foreign policy, not-
withstanding our claims to be participating in the "coalition of the will-
ing."43 
At the center of this idea of the new American is a notion of Aineri-
can innocence. By leaving Europe, Americans, our national story tells us, 
freed themselves from the corruption of Europe. We were reborn innocent. 
As I will suggest later on, this image has not always been a flattering one. 
Innocence can connote both blamelessness and naivete. Yet, generally, it is 
the former that we mean when we talk of ourselves in terms of innocence. 
We are Billy Budd about to have our first experience with evil. 
From time to time, our assertions of innocence collide with revela-
tions of not so innocent behavior. In such moments, we may struggle briefly 
with the contradictions, but, typically, we quickly seek shelter in comforting 
assertions that what we have seen is the aberration of "a few bad apples."44 
In his response to the breaking news of prisoner abuse and torture at Abu 
Ghraib, President Bush both condemned the behavior, and was quick to 
assert that Abu Ghraib was aberrational. We stand, after all, for freedom. 
Similarly, in the immediate aftermath of the revelations of the My Lai mas-
sacre, in the face of the vivid photographs of dead civilians, there was wide-
spread denial that the massacre occurred, or that we could have possibly 
been involved. The authors of a study on the American response to the news 
of My Lai captured this reaction in their title: It Didn't Happen and Be-
sides, They Deserved It. 45 Today My Lai is forgotten by many and has 
never been heard of by many too young to have forgotten it. And once again 
we think ourselves innocent. 
42 See generally DANIEL BELL, THE END OF IDEOLOGY: ON THE EXHAUSTION OF POLITICAL 
IDEAS IN THE FIFTIES (1960); FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN 
(1992); SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET, POLITICAL MAN: THE SOCIAL BASES OF POLITICS (1960). 
43 Steve Schifferes, US Names "Coalition of the Willing", BBC NEWS ONLINE, Mar., 18, 
2003, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi!americas/2862343.stm. 
44 See DANNER, supra note 11, at 27 (describing the '"few bad apples' argument, 
long the classic defense of states accused of torture" as the Bush Administration's 
"master narrative" of Abu Ghraib); Johanna McGeary, Pointing Fingers, TIME, 
May 24, 2004, at 44. 
45 Edward M. Opton, Jr. & Robert Duckles, It Didn't Happen and Besides, They Deserved 
It, in CRIMES OF WAR 441 (Richard A. Falk et al. eds., 1971 ). 
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III. HIDING TORTURE AND PROCLAIMING INNOCENCE 
"The United States of America does not torture." 46 
Today, we have more restrained sensibilities than our forbears did 
during the suppression of the Philippines insurrection. The world's collec-
tive distaste for such atrocious techniques is reflected in the Geneva Con-
ventions, and the conventions on human rights and torture. 47 America's 
public enthusiasm for torture is largely limited to such fantasies as the tele-
vision drama 2 4 and the musings of some law professors on ticking time 
bomb scenarios.48 Nevertheless, torture and abuse continue to be a part of 
our world, and in the "Global War on Terror" America commits, condones, 
and acquiesces in such acts. The two sections that follow examine the ways 
in which we try to distance ourselves from torture even as we are responsi-
ble for it. 
A. What Happens in Bagram, Stays in Bagram 
We also have to work, though, sort of the dark side, if you will. We've got 
to spend time in the shadows in the intelligence world. A lot of what needs 
to be done here will have to be done quietly, without any discussion, using 
sources and methods that are available to our intelligence agencies, if 
we're going to be successful. That's the world these folies operate in, and 
so it's going to be vital for us to use any means at our disposal, basically, 
to achieve our objective. 49 
While we may never know the extent of authorized torture that we 
have employed in the wars against Al Qaeda and Iraq, we have seen suffi-
46 Press Release, White House, President Tours Border, Discusses Immigration Reform in 
Texas (Nov. 29, 2005). 
47 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in 
Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 ·u.N.T.S. 31; Geneva Conven-
tion for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of 
Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention 
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 
135 [hereinafter Geneva III]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Per-
sons in Time ofWar, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287; Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, at 71, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. 
H/810 {Dec. 12, 1948); Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85. 
48 See, e.g., ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, WHY TERRORISM WORKS: UNDERSTANDING THE 
THREAT AND RESPONDING TO THE CHALLENGE 131-63 (2002) (advocating regulated use of 
torture pursuant to a court ordered torture warrant in so-called ticking bomb scenarios). 
49 Meet the Press (NBC television broadcast Sept. 16, 2001) (featuring Vice President 
Richard Cheney). 
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cient glimpses to know that torture done by Americans in the name of 
America is not simply the excesses of"a few bad apples."50 Because it takes 
us far afield from extraordinary rendition, I will only touch briefly on some 
of the ways that the United States has attempted to distance itself from its 
own acts of torture and abuse. 51 In recent years these efforts have included 
redefinitions or crabbed defmitions of the word torture, 52 delegation to off-
the-books agents, whether private contractors or the CIA, 53 and relegating 
our prisoners to jurisdictional netherworlds as ghost detainees, or as "enemy 
combatants," or to places, such as Guantanamo, where we assert that the 
U.S. Constitution and the courts do not reach. 54 Recent revelations that the 
CIA maintained secret prisons in Eastern Europe not only suggested that the 
so-called "new Europe"55 may not have abandoned the facilities or tech-
niques of its Warsaw Pact past, but gives a small glimpse of what is widely 
assumed to be a network of secret prisons. 56 There, in the shadows, beyond 
the reach of international humanitarian organizations such as the Red Cross, 
and beyond the notice and attention of Americans, America's captives in the 
War Against Terror are left to the mercy of apparently unaccountable 
American civilian or military forces. Disappeared to nowhere, some of our 
prisoners simply cease to exist, and one cannot torture a ghost. While some 
50 See DANNER, supra note 11, at 27. 
51 For a discussion of a variety of techniques employed by states to hide or deny their 
responsibility for "state crime," that similarly sees this distancing as at least partly a process 
of "othering," see Ruth Jamieson & Kieran McEvoy, State Crime by Proxy and Juridical 
Othering, 45 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 504 (2005). 
52 See, e.g., Bybee Memorandum, supra note 11. The Bush administration ultimately 
renounced the definitional limits of the Bybee Memorandum, but has continued to evade 
acknowledging that techniques such as waterboarding or the use of stress positions constitute 
torture. 
53 On the CIA and torture, see generally JAMES RlSEN, STATE OF WAR: THE SECRET 
HISTORY OF THE CIA AND THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION 20-3 7 (2006). 
54 The United States Supreme Court rejected at least the strong version of this claim in 
Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004) (holding that detainees at Guantanamo Naval Base in 
Cuba are not beyond the reach of habeas corpus relief). The White House position appears to 
be that the U.S. Constitution similarly only has limited reach into the Oval Office. For a 
discussion of torture at Guantanamo, see SEYMOUR M. HERSH, CHAIN OF CoMMAND: THE 
ROAD FROM 9/11 TO ABu GHRAIB 1-14 (2004); Jane Mayer, The Experiment, NEW YORKER, 
July 11, 2005, at 60. For a discussion of both Guantanamo and Abu Ghraib, and the relation-
ship between the two, see DANNER, supra note 11, at 26-48. 
55 In January 2003, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld criticized France and Germany 
for their opposition to U.S. policy. He dismissed them as belonging to "old Europe" in con-
trast to former Warsaw Pact countries that supported U.S. policy. Donald Rumsfeld, Sec'y of 
Def., U.S. Dep't of Def., Briefing at the Foreign Press Center (Jan. 22, 2003), available at 
http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2003/tO 1232003 _tO 122sdfpc.html. 
56 RlSEN, supra note 53, at 29-37; Dana Priest, CIA Holds Terror Suspects in Secret Pris-
ons, WASH. POST, Nov. 2, 2005, at Al. 
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of these maneuvers have come to light, 57 in an administration that is ob-
sessed with secrecy, there is no way of knowing the extent to which we 
have hidden instances of torture and abuse. 
In addition to these well-publicized efforts to distance ourselves 
from our own acts of torture and abuse, one other recent revelation, which 
bas not gained the same level of press attention merits mention, in part be-
cause of its echoes of similar practices during the Vietnam War. This is the 
practice of instructing American military personnel in the techniques of 
torture with a nod and a wink in the guise of teaching resistance to interro-
gation. 
In his 1967 critique of American militarism and of the Green Beret, 
The New Legions, former Green Beret Sergeant Donald Duncan describes 
the training that be both received and later gave in torture techniques. 58 
Duncan acknowledges that Special Forces doctrine favored psychological 
methods over physical methods for interrogations. 59 Nevertheless, he ar-
gues, Green Beret training also signaled that in some instances resort to 
physical methods was appropriate. 60 In his book, he recounts the following 
exchange between an instmctor and a trainee: 
"Sergeant Lacey, the name of this class is 'Counter-measures to Hostile 
Interrogation,' but you have spent most of the period telling us there are no 
counter-measures. If this is true, then the only reason for teaching them, it 
seems to me, is so that we'll know how to use them. Are you suggesting 
we use these methods?" 
The class laughs, and Lacey looks down at the floor, creating a dramatic 
pause. When he raises his head, his face is solemn but his deep-set eyes . 
are dancing. "We can't tell you that, Sergeant Harrison. The Mothers of 
America wouldn't approve." The class bursts into laughter at the sarcastic 
cynicism. "Furthermore," a conspiratorial wink, "we will deny that any 
such thing is taught or intended."61 
57 Priest, supra note 56. 
58 DONALD DUNCAN, THENEWLEGIONS 156-61 (1967). 
59 !d. at 156-57. 
60 !d. at 156-61. 
61 !d. at 159. This practice of teaching torture techniques under the cover of teaching resis-
tance to torture or techniques "to avoid" appears to be widespread. For example, during the 
1960s and 1970s, students at the American-run International Police Academy wrote essays 
on torture that in some instances embraced its use. They also were shown a film on improper 
interrogation techniques. MICHAEL MCCLINTOCK, INSTRUMENTS OF STATECRAFT: U.S. 
GUERILLA WARFARE, COUNTER-INSURGENCY, AND COUNTER-TERRORISM, 1940-1990 193-96 
(1992). For a discussion of a similar practice among British special forces troops in Northern 
Ireland, where in addition to the official rules, special forces followed the unwritten '"big 
boys' rules," see Jamieson & McEvoy, supra note 51, at 508-09. 
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U.S. Army interrogators who served in Vietnam tell a similar ac-
count of what James Gibson has described as a "dual structure" in their cur-
riculum. 62 Their "legal education" taught from the official manuals was 
coupled with "an illegal education taught orally by instructors. "63 
Recent revelations about interrogation practices at Guantanamo Na-
val Base indicate that detainees are similarly suffering abuse that is a prod-
uct of training originally designed to help American servicemen and ser-
vicewomen resist interrogation and torture. Journalist Jane Mayer writes 
that psychologists associated with the "Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and 
Escape" (SERE) training program taught at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, 
have tried to "reverse-engineer" the SERE program, in order to devise 
methods to help place Guantanamo detainees tmder sufficient stress to break 
them. 64 Mayer notes that many of the coercive techniques employed at 
Guantanamo are similar to those used in SERE training. 65 While SERE 
training clearly is intended for its stated purpose, unlike the training de-
scribed by Duncan during his Green Beret days, under the cover of the 
SERE program, its teachings have taken on a more pernicious use. 66 
B. Othering Torture 
"[After declining to eliminate a group of prisoners, we were later told by 
base camp that} you wouldn 't have to do it; all you had to do was give 
them over to the Vietnamese. '"67 
"Khong, danh cho co" 
"If they are not guilty, beat them until they are. "68 
1. The Division of Terror in Vietnam 
The Vietnamese were not the only perpetrators of torture during the 
Vietnam War. While official American military policy did not encourage 
torture, American interrogators sometimes used physical coercion and en-
gaged in other abusive tactics, without sanction or disapproval. 69 While 
some returning veterans may have exaggerated or fabricated their stories of 
torture, abusive conduct, and murder of prisoners, there are too many ac-
62 JAMES W. GIBSON, THE PERFECT WAR: TECHNOW AR IN VIETNAM 183 (1986). 
63 !d. at 183-85. 
64 Mayer, supra note 54, at 63-64. 
65 !d. at 64. 
66 See id. at 67. 
67 Donald Duncan, "The Whole Thing Was a Lief", 4 RAMPARTS 12,21 (1966). 
68 Saigon police slogan, quoted in AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, POLITICAL PRISONERS IN 
SOUTH VIETNAM 27 (1973) [hereinafter AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL). 
69 GIBSON, supra note 62, at 182-87. The enemy also used torture and terror techniques. 
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counts of such behavior to deny that sometimes American soldiers and ma-
rines tortured their Vietnamese prisoners. Veterans who testified at the Win-
ter Soldier Investigation, organized by Vietnam Veterans against the War, 
and at the Congressional hearings on war crimes, organized by Congress-
man Ron Dellums, gave ample examples of a wide array of torture practices 
and techniques including, beatings, threatened rapes, water torture, electric 
shocks to the genitals and other parts of the body, and locking prisoners in a 
room to spend the night with a python. 70 
Typically, however, it was not American servicemen who tortured 
or killed prisoners. 71 That task was left for the Vietnamese. 72 The wide-
spread practice was for Americans to tum over prisoners to the ARVN or to 
the National Police, knowing that the prisoners were almost certain to be 
tortured and possibly killed. 73 Objecting to this practice, Peter Hamill 
wrote: 
The fact is that American soldiers-who are now doing almost all of the 
fighting-are violating the Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of 
Prisoners of War every day. It is a violation for soldiers of one army to 
turn over prisoners of war to soldiers of another army. And that is pre-
cisely what we do. 
Every correspondent in Vietnam knows this, and has seen it for himself. 
An American unit will move into a village, or an area, and round up every 
male. A South Vietnamese liaison officer will then interrogate each man, 
and if he believes the man is a VietCong guerilla, or even a sympathizer, 
the man will be taken off to a detainment camp. After detailed interroga-
tion, he is usually executed. 74 
70 THE DELLUMS COMMITIEE HEARINGS ON WAR CRIMES IN VIETNAM: AN INQUIRY INTO 
COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 83-156 (Citizens' Comm'n of Inquiry eds., 
1972) [hereinafter DELLUMS COMMITTEE HEARINGS]; see also VIETNAM VETERANS AGAINST 
THE WAR, THE WINTER SOLDIER INvESTIGATION: AN INQUIRY INTO AMERICAN WAR CRIMES 
101-21 (1972) [hereinafter VIETNAM VETERANS AGAINST THE WAR]. At the time, the Nixon 
administration charged that many of the testifying witnesses were never in Vietnam. Unfor-
tunately, that allegation has had considerable persistence. In fact, the Vietnam Veterans 
Against the War carefully vetted their witnesses and established that they were in Vietnam 
when they said they were. For a discussion of these hearings, see ANDREW E. Hum, THE 
TuRNING: A HISTORY OF VIETNAM VETERANS AGAINST THE WAR 55-76 (1999); GERALD 
NICOSIA, HOME TOW AR: A HISTORY OF THE VIETNAM VETERANS' MOVEMENT 73-93 (200 1 ). 
71 lNTHENAME OF AMERICA 66 (Seymour Melman ed., 1968). 
72 See Strassfeld, supra note 18, at 914. 
73 Jd.; IN THE NAME OF AMERICA, supra note 71, at 66-69. The process of transferring 
prisoners and their subsequent treatment is described in Orville Schell, Cage for the Inno-
cents, in WHo WEARE 130-44 (Robert Manning & Michael Janeway eds., 1969). 
74 Peter Hamill, N.Y. POST, Ju1y 22, 1966, quoted in IN THE NAME OF AMERICA, supra note 
71, at 66-67. 
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The practice of transferring prisoners of war to another country's 
control without determining that the receiving country will abide by the 
Geneva Convention's provisions regarding the treatment of prisoners of war 
violates that Convention. 75 Nevertheless, the practice of transfer, and the 
consequences for the prison~rs was well known both to the American mili-
tary and to those who cared to notice in the United States. Certainly by 
1965, if not earlier, the U.S. press had frequently described the torture prac-
tices of ARVN interrogators. 76 The following year, Ohio Senator Stephen 
Young protested the practice on the Senate floor. 77 Nevertheless, Americans 
continued to transfer prisoners to their Vietnamese counterparts and to ob-
serve the torture of those prisoners throughout the war. 78 
_ American servicemen tended to argue that they could not protest 
without risking retaliation or harm to their military careers. 79 In fact, little 
evidence exists of any such retaliation. 80 Americans also argued that protest 
would be futile and would only have the effect of alienating their Vietnam-
ese ally. 81 In response to this argument, journalist Malcolm Browne wrote: 
I must observe here that if the United States ever had had a really serious 
objection to the torture of Viet Cong prisoners, the practice could have 
been swiftly halted. On the one hand, the United States dominates Viet 
Nam's armed forces, and on the other, it contends it has no control over 
such matters as the torture of prisoners. 82 
In fact, American military doctrine relied on the South Vietnamese 
to engage in torture, abuse, and murder. It was more than just a convenience 
75 Geneva III, supra note 47, art. 12. 
76 See, e.g., MALCOLM W. BROWNE, THE NEW FACE OF WAR, 195-202 (rev. ed. 1968); 
Lloyd Garrison, U.S. Tries to Curb Vietnam Torture, N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 1965, at 2.; Neil 
Sheehan, Vietnam: The Unofficial Brutality, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 1965, at 4; IN THE NAME 
OF AMERICA, supra note 71, at 58-90, 110-16 (collecting newspaper articles and other 
sources). Indeed, in a New York Times article from November 1963, which focused primar-
ily on the torture of political prisoners under the Diem regime, the author said of the use of 
electric shocks in torture, that "[m]any United States military advisers and foreign newsmen 
have seen variations of this torture applied to Vietcong suspects in the field." Political Pris-
oners in Vietnam Tell of Torture, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 1963, at 4. 
77 IN THE NAME OF AMERICA, supra note 71, at 66. 
78 See, e.g., DELLUMS COMMITTEE HEARINGS, supra note 70, at 85-90 (testimony of SP/5 
Nathan Hale) (describing hanging and beating of prisoners in the presence of Americans); 
DUNCAN, supra note 58, at 180-82 (describing incident where frustrated Vietnamese interro-
gator cut the gall bladder out of a prisoner as U.S. Special Forces looked on); VIETNAM 
VETERANS AGAINST THE WAR, supra note 70, at 101-05 (testimony of SP/4 Steve Noetzel) 
(describing ARVN guards throwing prisoners out of helicopters in flight). 
79 See Strassfeld, supra note 18, at 914. 
80 !d. 
81 See id. 
82 BROWNE, supra note 76, at 198. 
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for the Vietnamese to do much of the dirty work of harsh interrogation. Nor 
was it simply a matter of taking advantage of the lmowledge of language 
and culture that the Vietnamese had. Donald Duncan recalls that his instruc-
tors in countermeasures to interrogation taught: 
When you are in a foreign country as part of a guerrilla organization, you 
will not be doing the interrogating. Your job is to teach the various meth-
ods of interrogation to your indigenous counterpart. It would be very bad 
form for you, as an outsider, to do the questioning-especially if it gets 
nasty. The forces opposing your guerillas will probably be a native, be the 
same color, have the same religion. If you display a willingness to harm 
the natives, even though they are the enemy, it could be misunderstood by 
your guerrillas as prejudice. The indigenous guerrilla leader must believe 
that the idea for a course of action comes from himself; your control must 
b b . 83 e y suggestiOn. 
What is at work here is what I have elsewhere described as a "divi-
sion of terror."84 American forces largely limited themselves to '"legal' 
terrors [such] as free fire zones, napalm, white phosphorous, defoliation, 
fragmentation bombs," relocations of populations to strategic hamlets, and 
dropping more tonnage of bombs than we had in World War II. 85 We 
mostly left to our Vietnamese counterparts unseemly terrors, such as kid-
napping and assassination, and "torture and murder of prisoners."86 In so 
doing, we were not "helpless onlookers," but beneficiaries of their actions. 87 
The Vietnamese were not oblivious to the hypocrisy involved. One Viet-
namese officer said to Malcolm Browne: 
"You don't like the methods we apply to prisoners and the way we do 
business in the field .... But you have nothing against the use of artillery 
barrages, and air strikes using heavy bombs and napalm. Have you ever 
visited a hamlet hit by napalm after your planes have finished?" 88 
Torture carried out on the field, or back at the base in the immediate 
aftermath of a battle or a sweep through a village where often peasants were 
indiscriminately rounded up for interrogation, was only a small part of the 
routine of torture practiced by the Vietnamese. Torture was also widely 
used by the National Police against those deemed to be political threats to 
the various Vietnamese regimes that governed during our involvement there 
83 
DUNCAN, supra note 58, at 159. 
84 Strassfeld, supra note 18, at 919. 
85 Id. 
86 Id. 
87 Id. 
88 
BROWNE, supra note 76, at 200. 
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and to determine whether arrestees posed a threat to the government. 89 
While typically the government classified these prisoners as suspected 
communists, one could land in a South Vietnamese prison for any number 
of reasons ranging from being a Buddhist, especially during the Diem re-
gime, to "neutralism," to participating in a student demonstration or a peace 
demonstration, to offending a neighbor or Village Chief who then sought 
revenge by identifying you as part of the National Liberation Front infra-
structure under the Phoenix Program. 90 
A 1973 Amnesty International report noted that the "United States 
[was] intimately involved in the funding and training of the [National] po-
lice" and, therefore, deeply implicated in the imprisonment and torture of 
political prisoners throughout our involvement in Vietnam. 91 The training 
and expansion of the National Police was largely a project of the Office for 
Public Safety of the Agency for International Development. 92 At least in 
some instances, that training appears to have included instruction in physi-
cally coercive interrogation techniques. 93 One Vietnamese graduate of the 
American-run International Police Academy, in an essay on coercive inter-
rogation techniques entitled Three Ways of Interrogation, thanked "the 
United States for having 'assisted the national police in technical and 
equipments aid to help an interrogator in his interrogation of communist 
prisoners to be more effective. "'94 
The leaders of the coup that overthrew the Diem regime in Novem-
ber 1963 released thousands of political prisoners. 95 Quickly, however, and 
especially after a 1965 coup toppled the Khanh government and brought 
General Nguyen Cao Ky to power, the South Vietnamese government began 
to refill its jails. Though accurate numbers were hard to establish, "neutral-
ists, peace leaders, and former prisoners themselves" estimated the number 
as at least 200,000 in 1970.96 Three years later, Amnesty International con-
cluded that despite the April 1973 peace treaty, which required prisoner 
89 HOLMES BROWN & DON LUCE, HOSTAGES OF WAR: SAIGON'S POLITICAL PRISONERS 7-10 
(1973); ALFRED HASSLER, SAIGON, U.S.A. 80-97 (1970); see also MARILYN B. YOUNG, THE 
VlETNAMWARS: 1945-1990 145 (1991). 
90 HASSLER, supra note 89, at 91-92, 96. 
91 AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 68, at 13. 
92 The United States bankrolled the police force's expansion from 19,000 men in 1962 
under the Diem government, to 114,000 in 1972, with plans for further expansion, and had 
trained the additional men. Id In addition to the National Police force, various other police 
forces and intelligence services operated in South Vietnam. 
93 See McCLINTOCK, supra note 61, at 194-95. 
94 Id at 195 (citing Nguyen Van Thieu, Three Ways of Interrogation, Aug. 10, 1965). 
95 Political Prisoners in Vietnam Tell of Torture, supra note 76, at 4. 
96 HASSLER, supra note 89, at 96-7. 
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release, the Saigon government was still holding at least 70,000-75,000 po-
litical prisoners and that the number might exceed 100,000 prisoners. 97 
The National Police Headquarters was one of the most feared loca-
tions in South Vietnam, and the Saigon government established provincial 
interrogation centers in each of its provinces. 98 United States military and 
civilian personnel were deeply implicated in the prison system, with Ameri-
can advisers assigned throughout the system. 
The symbol of state repression in South Vietnam became the Tiger 
Cages at the prison on Con Son Island.99 Originally built by the French, 100 
the Saigon government readily adopted this symbol of French colonial rule. 
The Tiger Cages were tiny overcrowded cells in a hidden part of the Con 
Son prison that were open on the top to the elements and to the abuses of 
prison guards. 101 Prisoners, some sent there for refusing to salute the Viet-
namese or American flags, were malnourished, brutalized, and forced to 
remain in cramped positions. 102 Many were permanently crippled by their 
confinement in such small space, left unable to walk or to stand erect. 103 
Americans learned of the Tiger Cages through the efforts of Don 
Luce, an American who was working in Vietnam with the International 
Voluntary Services and the World Council of Churches, and a Vietnamese 
college student who had recently been released from Con Son prison. 104 
Together with Tom Harkin, then a congressional aide, they persuaded Con-
gressmen Augustus Hawkins and William Anderson to charter a plane and 
investigate Con Son. 105 Armed with a map drawn by the released prisoner, 
they went intent on finding the Tiger Cages. 106 Before they got to Con Son, 
Frank Walton, Director of the U.S. Public Safety program in Vietnam as-
sured them the prison was not really like a prison. 107 Rather, it "is more like 
a Boy Scout Recreational Camp." 108 Despite Walton's and the prison com-
mander's efforts to keep them from discovering the Tiger Cages, they man-
aged to find the door that the Vietnamese student had told them about and to 
97 
AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 68, at 7-8. 
98 See HASSLER, supra note 89, at 80; YOUNG, supra note 89, at 145. 
99 See BROWN & LUCE, supra note 89. 
100 Id. at 36. 
101 Id. at 39-41. 
102 Id. at 36. 
1m Id. 
104 Id.; The Tiger Cages of Con Son, LIFE, July 17, 1970, at 26[hereinafter Tiger Cages]. 
See also Ralph Graves, Editor's Note: How They Uncovered the Tiger Cages, LIFE, July 17, 
1970, at 2A. 
105 Graves, supra note 104, at 2A. 
106 Id.; Tiger Cages, supra note 104, at 26. 
107 
BROWN & LUCE, supra note 89, at 36. 
108 Tiger Cages, supra note 104, at 29. 
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cause a commotion that ultimately resulted in their getting to the Tiger 
Cages. 109 There they found prisoners starving and thirsty who complained 
bitterly of their treatment. 110 Walton's response was to berate the visitors 
for "poking your nose into doors that aren't your business." 111 On the return 
flight, another member of the Congressional delegation tried to seize the 
camera with which Harkin had photographed the Tiger Cages. 112 
The Saigon government promised to get rid of the Tiger Cages. 113 
However, the following year the United States Department of the Navy con-
tracted with a construction consortium, "Raymond, Morrison, Knudson-
Brown, Root and Jones to build 384 new 'isolation cells' to replace the Ti-
ger Cages." 114 These new cells were two square feet smaller, 115 and far less 
well ventilated then the Tiger Cages they replaced. 116 The funding for the 
.cells came from the U.S. Food for Peace Program, and the construction la-
bor was provided by prisoners being paid fifty-five to seventy-two cents per 
week. 117 The Brown and Root components of this construction consortium 
are the Brown and Root of the Haliburton subsidiary, KBR. 118 Most re-
cently, they capitalized on their expertise to build the cells at Guantanamo 
Naval Base. 119 
2. A Different "Vietnam Syndrome" 
Americans have noted what has been described as a "Vietnam Syn-
drome" resulting from our unhappy experience in America's longest, and 
least successful, war. 120 In the aftermath of Vietnam, Americans have 
shown great reluctance to support military ventures involving the commit-
ment of American troops unless the war promised to be short with minimal 
American casualties. Americans have also shown greater willingness to 
question the motives and judgment of their government whenever it has 
109 BROWN & LUCE, supra note 89, at 3 8; Graves, supra note 104, at 2A. 
110 Tiger Cages, supra note 104, at 26-29. 
111 !d. at29. 
112 Graves, supra note 104, at 2A. 
113 BROWN & LUCE, supra note 89, at 43; Saigon is Investigating 'Tiger Cage' Cells at a 
Prison, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 1970, at 9; 500 from Con Son Flown to Saigon, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 15, 1970, at 1. 
114 Id at 43. 
11s Id. 
116 AMNESTY lNTERNA TIONAL, supra note 68, at 21. 
117 Don Luce, We've Been Here Before: The Tiger Cages of Vietnam, HIST. NEWS 
NETWORK, Apr. 4, 2005, http://hnn.us/articles/llOOl.html; George Wald, The Other Prison-
ers, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 1972, at 33. 
118 Luce, supra note 117. 
119 Id. 
120 HERRING, supra note 15, at 307-12; YOUNG, supra note 89, at 314-16. 
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engaged in saber rattling. This healthy reluctance to commit American 
troops to battle has at times impeded the ability of the United States gov-
ernment to act unfettered in the world. 
There is, however, a second Vietnam Syndrome that goes much less 
noticed. Even as the war was being fought, members of the foreign policy 
and defense establishment were second-guessing our approach to the war. 121 
Ever since, revisionist accounts have adhered to the fantasy that the war was 
winnable if only we had fought it differently. 122 Some of these revisionist 
accounts essentially simply repeat the often expressed Vietnam-era com-
plaint that our military was "forced to fight with one hand tied behind its 
back." 123 Others, however, suggest that a combination of a more muscular 
civic action program and the CIA's Phoenix Program, which was intended 
to "neutralize" the "Viet Cong infrastructure," and which resulted in the 
killing of at least 20,000 supposed members of that infrastructure and the 
kidnapping or arrest and torture and imprisonment of perhaps double that 
number, would have resulted in victory. 124 
As Michael Klare and Cynthia Arnson have shown, even during the 
Vietnam War, voices for greater reliance on aggressive and early police 
action against "subversives" suggested that the United States could further 
its policy goals by assisting indigenous proxy forces, rather than by the 
heavy handed, and sometimes self-defeating commitment of major military 
121 See infra text accompanying notes 125-131. 
122 The revisionist literature that contends that the war was a winnable noble cause contin-
ues to grow. Important examples include, GUENTER LEWY, AMERICA IN VIETNAM (1978); 
U.S. GRANT SHARP, STRATEGY FOR DEFEAT (1978); LEWIS SORLEY, A BETTER WAR: THE 
UNEXAMINED VICTORIES AND FINAL TRAGEDY OF AMERICA'S LAST YEARS IN VIETNAM 
(1999); HARRY G. SUMMERS, JR., ON STRATEGY: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE VIETNAM WAR 
(1982); WILLIAM C. WESTMORELAND, A SOLDIER REPORTS (1976). 
123 For an example of this mantra, see OLIVER L. NORTH & DAVID ROTH, ONE MORE 
MISSION: OLIVER NORTH RETURNS TO VIETNAM passim (1993). This idea is also expressed in 
the film RAMBo: FIRST BLOOD PART II (TriStar Pictures 1985). There troubled super survivor 
Vietnam veteran John Rambo (Sylvester Stallone) is sent on a mission to postwar Vietnam to 
investigate rumors of captive American POWs still being held by the Vietnamese. Upon 
accepting the mission, Rambo asks, "Do we get to win this time." For a discussion of the 
film, see John Hellman, Rambo's Vietnam and Kennedy's New Frontier, in INVENTING 
VIETNAM: THE WAR IN FILM AND TELEVISION 140-52 (Michael Andregg ed., 1991 ); Gregory 
A. Waller, Rambo: Getting to Win This Time, in FROM HANOI TO HOLLYWOOD: THE VIETNAM 
WAR IN AMERICAN FILM 113-128 (Linda Dittmar & Gene Michaud eds., 1990). For a critical 
comment on the "one hand tied behind their backs" explanation of the war's outcome, see 
Bob Buzzanco, 25 Years After End of Vietnam War: Myths Keep Us from Coming to Terms 
with Vietnam, BALTIMORE SUN, Apr. 17, 2000, available at www.commondreams.or 
g/views/041700-1 06.htrn. 
124 On Phoenix, see JOHN PRADOS, LOST CRUSADER: THE SECRET WARS OF CIA DIRECTOR 
WILLIAM COLBY 207-38 (2003); YOUNG, supra note 89, at 212-13; see generally JEFF STEIN, 
A MURDER IN WARTIME: THE UNTOLD SPY STORY THAT CHANGED THE COURSE OF THE 
VIETNAM WAR (1992). 
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force. 125 Speaking to the International Police Academy in late 1965, Gen-
eral Maxwell Taylor stated: 
The outstanding lesson [of Vietnam] . . . is that we should never let an-
other Vietnam-type situation arise again. We were too late in recognizing 
the extent of the subversive threat. We appreciate now that every young, 
emerging country must be constantly on the alert, watching for those 
symptoms which, if allowed to develop unrestrained, may eventually grow 
into a disastrous situation such as that in South Vietnam .... We have 
learned the need for a strong police force and a strong police intelligence 
organization to assist in identifying early the symptoms of an incipient 
subversive situation. 126 
Elaborating on this idea, Undersecretary of State U. Alexis Johnson, articu-
lated a notion of policing of dissidents as "preventive medicine." 127 By sup-
pressing -dissident organizations before they could gain significant popular 
support, the United States could avoid future Vietnams. 128 
In accordance with this approach, in the 1960s and 1970s AID's Office of 
Public Safety worked closely with the police and paramilitary forces of 
some of the most repressive regimes in the world, including Iran, Chile, 
Brazil, Guatemala, El Salvador, and Indonesia. 129 Even before the creation 
of the Office of Public Safety, U.S. programs provided police training to a 
wide array of police forces. 130 Between 1954 and 1975, the United States 
trained over 7,500 foreign police officers in the U.S. and over a million po-
lice officers abroad. 131 Obviously, many of these trainees came from non-
repressive states, but the American footprint resulting from these training 
programs has also been large in authoritarian regimes. While Congress put 
an end to the Office of Public Safety program in 1975, the United States has 
given training and support to the agents of repressive regimes in a variety of 
other ways. 132 
125 See generally MICHAEL T. KLARE & CYNTHIA ARNSON, SUPPLYING REPRESSION: U.S. 
SUPPORT FOR AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES ABROAD (1981). 
126 Id at 19. 
121 Id 
12s Id 
129 Id at 19-27; Cynthia Arnson, Window on the Past: A Declassified History of Death 
Squads in El Salvador, in DEATH SQUADS IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE: MURDER WITH 
DENIABILITY 85, 92-93 (Bruce B. Campbell & Arthur D. Brenner eels., 2000) (describing the 
Office of Public Safety's assistance to the El Salvador regime during the 1960s). 
130 EDWARD S. HERMAN, THE REAL TERROR NETWORK: TERRORISM IN FACT AND 
PROPAGANDA 127 (1982). 
131 Id 
132 MCCLINTOCK, supra note 61. 
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In this era of globalization, torture is a global phenomenon. 133 The 
United States has indirectly supported torture by training and supplying the 
militaries of countries that engage in torture and other repressive techniques, 
and by bolstering those countries with economic support. 134 The United 
States has also permitted private manufacturers to sell the implements of 
torture and abuse to an array of repressive regimes. A 2003 Amnesty Inter-
national Report, The Pain Merchants found that U.S. manufacturers ex-
ported $14.7 million worth of electroshock devices and $4.4 million worth 
of shackles and other restraints. 135 
A particularly troubling example of American involvement in the 
globalization of torture has been the operation of the School of the Ameri-
cas, now renamed the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Coopera-
tion, which is dedicated to training Latin American soldiers. 136 Founded in 
1946, though not dubbed the School of the Americas until 1963, the school 
represented part of America's reaction to the Cold War and perceived 
threats to stability in Latin America. 137 While many of the school's alumni 
have unblemished human rights records, many other graduates have partici-
pated in human rights abuses. 138 Indeed, one commentator states that the 
school's graduates "have played key roles in nearly every coup and major 
human rights violation in Latin America in the past fifty years." 139 
In the 1990s, the school's use of a number of manuals that coun-
seled the use of assassination, false arrest, intimidation of families of dissi-
dents, and torture came to light. 140 Pentagon officials attributed the manuals 
to overzealous junior officers who "simply assumed that U.S. laws against 
assassination, beatings, and blackmail applied only to U.S. citizens and thus 
were not applicable to the training of foreign military officers." 141 In addi-
tion to manuals prepared by the military, the school used two manuals pre-
133 See Jeffrey A. Sluka, Introduction: State Terror and Anthropology, in DEATH SQUAD: 
THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF STATE TERROR 3 (Jeffrey A. Sluka ed., 2000) ("[I]n 1996 over half of 
the world's governments were guilty of using torture on a systematic, institutionalized ba-
sis-that is, as a 'normal' mode of governance."). 
134 Jd at 119-32. See generally KLARE & ARNSON, supra note 125. 
135 See AMNESTY INT'L, THE PAIN MERCHANTS (2003), http://web.amnesty.org/library/pdf/ 
ACT400082003ENGLISH/$File/ACT4000803.pdf. 
136 Timothy J. Kepner, Torture 101: The Case Against the United States for Atrocities 
Committed by School of the Americas Alumni, 19 DICK. J. INT'L L. 475,476 (2001). 
137 Id at 478. 
138 See id at 476,480-81. 
139 Id at 476. 
140 Id at 486-87. 
141 Id at 488 (citing School of the Americas Watch, Pentagon Investigation Concludes that 
Techniques in SOA Manuals were "Mistakes", http://www.soaw.org/new/ 
article.php ?id=269. 
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pared by the C.I.A. 142 Both of these manuals included a chapter on coercive 
interrogation techniques. 143 
3. The Harms ofOthering Torture 
Recognizing the harms of torture, what are the additional harms of 
othering torture? Judge Richard Posner, who argues that sometimes torture 
is necessary and appropriate, suggests that a country might do best by dis-
tancing itself from its acts of torture in order to lessen the likelihood of de-
grading spillover effects on its culture. 144 Perhaps, he suggests, it is best left 
to "military personnel in a foreign country." 145 Without accepting his under-
lying premise that it would be irresponsible for a government not to torture 
under certain circumstances, one can pursue his logic an additional step. I 
assume that he contemplates a country relying on its own military to torture 
in a far-away place, but if distancing serves as a useful insulation, why not 
delegate, or outsource, if you will, the torture to someone else? 
One wrong of othering torture is that it shelters our culture only at 
the cost of impairing someone else's. When we other torture, by a division 
of terror, or by extraordinary rendition, we corrupt another society. When 
our hireling acts out of greed or economic want, our purchase of clean 
hands is a crass transaction. When, as in Vietnam, we delegate to those who 
we are ostensibly there to help, our conduct is particularly cynical. We un-
dermine the very same society that we profess to be assisting, and we cor-
rupt democratic values and the rule of law while we assert that we are acting 
for the noble purpose of bolstering them. 
The harmfulness of othering torture goes beyond the degrading ef-
fect that it has on the people that we ask to do our dirty work. Torture by its 
very nature others the victim. It reduces the victim to an object that is 
wholly dependent on the whim of the torturer. It robs the victim of her dig-
nity and of her ability to act on her own behalf, turning her will into a 
weapon against herself as she comes to be willing to do anything, including 
condemning herself and others to make the torture stop. It degrades the vic-
tim to the point where the victim is wholly other. She may physically appear 
human, but those things at the core of her humanity are no longer within her 
control. 146 When torture occurs in the setting of savage war, waged against 
142 Lisa Haugaard, Declassified Army and CIA Manuals used in Latin American: An Analy-
sis of Their Content, LATIN AMERICAN WORKING GROUP, Feb. 18, 1997, http://www.lawg.or 
g/misc/Publications-manuals.htm. 
143 !d. Excerpts from the manuals can be found at Latin American Working Group. 
144 Richard A. Posner, Torture, Terrorism, and Interrogation, in TORTURE: A COLLECTION 
291 (Sanford Levinson ed., 2004). 
145 !d. at 294-95. 
146 The best starting point for an understanding of torture's effects on its victims is ELAINE 
SCARRY, THE BODY IN PAIN: THE MAKING AND UNMAKING OF THE WORLD27-59 (1985). 
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people who are racially or ethnically different, it reinforces the beliefs, al-
ready inculcated in the troops to ready them to fight, that the enemy is an 
alien other. 
By relying on Vietnamese to torture and abuse other Vietnamese, 
we bolstered this sense of the Vietnamese as an alien barbaric other. Watch-
ing ARVN interrogators or National Police torture and murder helpless 
prisoners, many of them hapless civilians, could only reinforce American 
notions of the savagery of the Vietnamese. This, in turn, strengthened our 
justification for our own savagery, for our side of the division of tenor. It 
reinforced the beliefs that "they" only understood force and that brutality 
and torture were a part of "their" culture and therefore merely something 
that we had to reluctantly, but necessarily, embrace. During the operation 
that led to the destruction of the village of Ben Sue, ARVN interrogators 
tortured villagers as Americans looked on. 147 Explaining it all, an American 
officer said to journalist Jonathan Schell: 
"You see, they do have some-well, methods and practices that we are not 
accustomed to ... but the thing you've got to understand is that this is an 
Asian country, and their frrst impulse is force .... It's the Asian mind. It's 
completely different from what we know as the Western mind .... " 148 
Similarly, during that part of army dissenter Dr. Howard Levy's court-
martial, where he was permitted to raise a Nuremberg defense that U.S. 
Special Forces were committing war crimes in Vietnam, the Law Officer 
(the rough equivalent of a judge), Colonel Earl V. Brown, observed that 
there was an "endemic" propensity toward torture and a "rather careless 
attitude toward life" held by the peoples of Southeast Asia. 149 Perhaps most 
infamously, General William Westmoreland, commander of U.S. forces in 
Vietnam, articulated this notion when he said, "[t]he Oriental doesn't put 
the same high price on life as does the Westerner. Life is plentiful, life is 
cheap in the Orient. As the philosophy of the Orient expresses it, life is not 
important."150 Such sentiments constituted a blank check for savage war. 
Finally, by othering torture, we fail to recognize and acknowledge 
our own responsibility for what has happened to the victims. This failure to 
accept responsibility gives us a dangerously distorted sense of our past and 
147 YOUNG, supra note 89, at 174. 
148 ld (emphasis in original) (quoting Jonathan Schell). 
149 Transcript of Record at 979, 1000, United States v. Levy, 39 C.M.R. 672 (1968). Cf 
SLOTKIN, GUNFIGHTER NATION, supra note 26, at 528-29. 
15
° CHRISTIAN G. APPY, WORKING-CLASS WAR: AMERICAN COMBAT SOLDIERS AND 
VIETNAM 254 (1993). 
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of ourselves. 151 It also harms the victims a second time, by failing to take 
seriously their memory of harm. In the case of Vietnam, this failure to ac-
cept responsibility for our actions was connected to a tendency to read the 
Vietnamese out of the picture altogether. 152 In tallying the costs of the Viet-
nam War, for instance, former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara fo-
cused exclusively on the costs to the United States, despite the enormous 
loss of life and resources and the enormous harm to Vietnamese economy, 
society, and environment caused by the war. 153 Americans, in other words, 
have often framed their understanding of the war to be a story of American 
good intentions and American victimization. 154 
The Russian roulette scenes in Michael Cimino's 1978 academy-
award-winning film, The Deer Hunter, are especially vivid instances of the 
othering of atrocity and the representation of the notions of American inno-
cence and victimization. 155 One of the iconic images of the Vietnam War is 
the point-blank execution of a captured and bound National Liberation 
Front prisoner during the Tet offensive of 1968, by Chief of the National 
Police, General Nguyen Ngo Loan. 156 General Loan's execution of this 
prisoner on a Saigon street, with a pistol shot to the temple, was captured 
both by still photograph and film and seen the next day by millions of 
Americans. 157 As Bmce Franklin shows, Cimino clearly borrows from this 
image, but in his Russian roulette scenes, he inverts the image of Loan's 
execution of the prisoner. 158 Americans, not a Vietnamese prisoner of the 
American sponsored government of South Vietnam, become the victims. 159 
Cimino first introduces this imagery in a scene in which captured American 
151 I discuss this failure to accept responsibility more fully in Robert Strassfeld, Robert 
McNamara and the Art and Law of Confession: "A Simple Desultory Philippic (Or How I 
Was Robert McNamara 'd into Submission)", 47 DUKE L.J. 491 (1997). 
152 See id. at 559-560. 
153 On Robert McNamara's tendency to ignore the Vietnamese in his retrospective account 
of the Vietnam War, see id. at 559-60. 
154 See id. at 559. 
155 THE DEER HUNTER (Universal Studios 1978). 
156 H. BRUCE FRANKLfN, VIETNAM AND OTHER AMERICAN FANTASIES 14 (2000). 
157 Id. 
158 Id. at 14-16 (discussing THE DEER HUNTER, supra note 155). As Bruce Franklin de-
scribes, the inversion of the image of General Loan shooting a bound prisoner is but one of 
several instances where Cimino takes iconic images of the Vietnam War and turns them on 
their heads. Id. at 15-17. For instance, the American prisoners are kept in Tiger Cages, which 
as described above, were used by the South Vietnam government, under the direction of the 
same General Loan and, not by the National Liberation Front. Id. at 16. 
159 Id. at 15-16 (discussingTHEDEERHUNTER,supra note 155). 
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soldiers are forced by the enemy to play Russian roulette. 160 At the dramatic 
climax of the film, we encounter a gambling den in Saigon where Vietnam-
ese, Chinese, and Caucasians who have "gone native" all wager on the 
deadly game. 161 Once again, as in the earlier scene, the victim is American, 
not Vietnamese. 162 By this point, however, it is not simply a cruel enemy 
who is the perpetrator. 163 The operators of the gambling den are Chinese 
businessmen, and the gamblers are not North Vietnamese or National Lib-
eration Front soldiers but our "allies," the people of South Vietnam. 164 The 
victim, Nick, an American soldier, who survived the Russian roulette game 
as a prisoner, has sunk into the depths of self-destruction as a response to 
his Vietnam experience and is beyond his friend Michael's efforts to save 
him. 165 In Cimino's vision, Vietnam is a place where innocent Americans 
go and get hurt or destroyed. 
4. White Trash Talking: The "Other" America 
"They weren 't even pretending to get information out of them. It was rec-
reational white-trash torture." 166 
"We've got some hillbilly kids out of control." 167 
Of course, we know that Americans have engaged in prisoner 
abuse. Here too, however, we see a process of distancing and othering. As 
of the fall of 2005, there have been over 400 criminal investigations into 
allegations of detainee abuse. 168 One hundred fifty U.S. soldiers have been 
subjected to non-judicial punishment for their participation in detainee 
abuse, and military authorities have referred charges to courts-martial in the 
cases of seventy-four other soldiers. 169 Nevertheless, press coverage has 
focused overwhelmingly on two reservists, Specialist Charles Graner, Jr., 
and Private First Class Lynndie England. 
160 !d. at 16 (discussing THE DEER HUNTER, supra note 155). The mistreatment of American 
POW's is well documented. To the best of my knowledge, however, this scene is pure fabri-
cation, as I know of no evidence that American POW's were forced to play Russiao roulette. 
161 THEDEERHUNTER,supranote 155. 
162 !d. 
163 !d. 
164 !d. 
165 Id. 
166 Topic A with Tina Brown: Let the Countdown Begin, GAWKER, May 9, 2005, 
http://www.gawker.com/news/media/tina-brown/topic-a-with-tina-brown-let-the-countdown-
begin-102669.php (quoting Christopher Hitchens on Abu Ghraib). 
167 Senior Intelligence Official to Seymour Hersh. HERSH, supra note 54, at 362. 
168 Human Rights First, Torture: Quick Facts, http://www.humanrightsfrrst.org/us_law/ 
etn/rnisc/factsheet.htm# ednref7. 
169 See id. -
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This focus on Graner and England has conveniently allowed 
Americans and the military to indulge in the "few bad apples" notion. 
Moreover, the characterization of the two has fostered a process of distanc-
ing these bad apples from the rest of us. The image of Graner and England 
that emerges is that of stereotypical "white trash." Lewis Lapham says of 
them that they were "both looking not for a way into the halls of military 
glory but for a way out of the hollows of Appalachian poverty." 170 
Press coverage of Graner has focused on his messy divorce, his 
threats to and physical abuse of his ex-wife, and the three protective orders 
necessitated by his threatening behavior. 171 His troubled work life as a 
prison guard in a Pennsylvania Super Max prison, where there were allega-
tions of sadistic conduct toward prisoners, has also garnered considerable 
attention; though they have regrettably not prompted much discussion of 
prisoner abuse in the United States. 172 
If anything, the depiction of England, dubbed "the trailer-park tor-
turer," has played into white trash stereotypes even more than those of Gra-
ner. 173 Accounts typically mention her origins in a "one-stoplight town" in 
West Virginia. 174 There, she grew up in a trailer park, down a dirt road from 
a saloon and a sheep fann. 175 She married early and unsuccessfully and 
worked for a time on the nightshift in a chicken processing plant. 176 Prose-
cution witnesses described her as "undisciplined and promiscuous." 177 
Partly due to her defense strategy, she is depicted as at best learning dis-
abled and speech impaired, perhaps due to oxygen deprivation at birth. 178 
We are told that she was unable to speak in complete sentences until age 
170 Lewis H. Lapham, Condottieri, HARPER's MAG., June 1, 2005. 
171 See, e.g., Michael A. Fuoco et al., Suspect in Prisoner Abuse Has a Hist01y of Troubles; 
Whitehall Native Had Checkered Work Record, Stormy Marriage, PITT. PosT-GAZETTE, May 
8, 2004, at AI. 
172 See, e.g. ,id.; Ron Martz, President Bush Apologizes: "Sony for Humiliation", 
ATLANTA J.-CONST., May 7, 2004, at AI. For a much more nuanced treatment of Graner, see 
Paul Lieberman & Dan Morain, Unveiling the Face of the Prison Scandal, L.A. TIMES, June 
19,2004, at AI. 
173 Jennifer Wells, Leashes, Lynchings and Lyndie England, TORONTO STAR, Feb. 20, 2005, 
at Al2. 
174 See, e.g., Alexandra Rocky Fleming, A Soldier, a Mother-and a Court-Martial, 
PEOPLE, May 16, 2005, at 105; Ariel Sabar, Gus Sentementes & Jeff Barker, Families of the 
3 72d Tormented by Stories of POW Abuses in Iraq, BALTIMORE SUN, Apr. 30, 2004, at lA. 
175 Sabar et al., supra note 174; Dianne Williamson, Horrors of War Tar Women, Too, 
WORCESTER TELEGRAM & GAZETTE, May 9, 2004, at B 1. 
176 Dennis Cauchon et al., Abuse Scandal Meets Disbelief in Hometowns, USA TODAY, 
May 7, 2004, at A6; Martz, supra note 172. 
177 Iraqi Detainees IdentifY England As Their Abuser, CHIC. TRIBUNE, Aug. 6, 2004, at 10. 
178 Defense Urges Leniency in Soldier's Sentencing, L.A. TIMES, May 4, 2005, at A25; see 
also Fleming, supra note 174. 
2006] AMERICAN INNOCENCE 305 
seven. 179 She is variously described as either "a fool in love" easily led by 
Graner or as sharing with him a taste for sexual sadism. 180 
The depiction of the two gets a Jerry Springeresque twist because of 
the tawdry relationship between them, complicated by a love-triangle in-
volving a third reservist at Abu Ghraib. 181 We learned from the press that 
among the originally unreleased Abu Ghraib photographs were pictures of 
Graner's and England's sexual escapades. 182 Indeed, some of the sexually-
oriented prisoner abuse photographs were purportedly intended by Graner 
as a birthday gift to England. 183 Moreover, England turned out to be preg-
nant, and she asserted that Graner is the child's father. 184 Graner denied 
paternity of the child. 185 Graner, however, spumed England and married 
Specialist Megan Ambuhl, another reservist involved in the Abu Ghraib 
scandal. 186 
Whether or not the depictions of Graner and England accurately 
capture them, the media focus on those two from amongst all the Americans 
accused of prisoner abuse, reinforces the official response that the events at 
Abu Ghraib were aberrational and do not represent America. Prisoner abuse 
becomes the sadistic diversion of "trailer trash." Though the American faces 
in the Abu Ghraib pictures may look like ours, the representation of Graner 
and England allows many Americans to use class, geography, lifestyle, and 
education to distance themselves from torture and abuse. 
IV. THE END OF AMERICAN INNOCENCE? 
0' beautiful, for spacious skies 
But now those skies are threatening 
They're beating plowshares into swords 
For this tired old man that we elected king 
Armchair warriors often fail 
And we've been poisoned by these fairy tales 
The lawyers clean up all details 
179 Michelle Saxton, Symbol of Prison Scandal to Plead Guilty, BERGEN CoUNTY (N.J.) 
REcoRD, May 1, 2005, at A6. 
18
° Fleming, supra note 174; Cauchon et al., supra note 176; Richard A. Serrano, Female 
Reservist to Plead Guilty, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 30, 2005, at A10; Defense Urges Leniency in 
Soldier's Sentencing, supra note 178; Iraqi Detainees IdentifY England As Their Abuser, 
supra note 177. See generally Martz, supra note 172. 
181 See Fleming, supra note 174. 
182 Robert H. Reid, New Abu Ghraib Images Aired, CHICAGO SUN TIMES, Feb. 16, 2006, at 
28. 
183 Graner Led Abuse at Abu Ghraib, Witnesses Testify, CHIC. TRm., Jan. 11, 2005, at C7. 
184 Fleming, supra note 174. 
185 Id. 
186 Id. 
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Since daddy had to lie 
But this is the end 
This is the end of the innocence187 
"'T''h if' . fid' l'k ldd "188 1 , e age o znnocence 1s a zng 1 e an o ream 
What do we mean by American innocence? As described above, it 
is a notion of American exceptionalism, a freedom from the legacies of feu-
dalism and monarchy, from the constraints of histmy, a new stati for new 
men in a new land. To be sure, there are things that are unique to the 
American experience, but it is a mistake to be blinded by those differences. 
America's past, like the past of other countries, is hardly innocent; though 
we hold onto to the trope of innocence fiercely. 
Innocence can also mean naivete. We talk of the innocence of 
youth. It is the state of being before learning about one's surroundings and 
before confronting evil. The Americans of Henry James' novels are such 
innocents, unprepared for their experiences abroad. 189 Innocence tends to 
lead to the undoing of James' American protagonists. It is necessary for 
them, like Adam, to experience a fall, caused by their inexperience and lack 
of understanding, but in the end, the fall opens up the possibility for growth 
and the beginning ofunderstanding. 190 
After September 11, 2001, it became commonplace for people to 
say that on that terrible date America lost its innocence. It is not altogether 
clear, however, what precisely the proclaimers of the loss of American in-
nocence had in mind. Some have responded to such claims by reminding the 
speakers that we have heard this all before. Just as proclamations of Ameri-
can innocence is a recurrent theme in our national self-depiction, so too are 
periodic statements of the loss of innocence. 191 Yet, we hear the refrain of 
the loss of innocence so often that, perhaps, we need to give it some credit. 
Do either of the senses of "loss of innocence" discussed above de-
scribe America in the aftermath of September 11th? The first version of 
"American innocence" grossly overstates the flawlessness of our character 
187 DoN HENLEY, The End of the Innocence, on THE END OF THE INNOCENCE (Geffen Re-
cords 1989). 
188 IRON MAIDEN, Age of Innocence, on DANCE OF DEATH (Columbia Records 2003). 
189 See R.W.B. LEWIS, supra note 40, at 152-55. 
190 !d.; see also Emory Elliott, 2003 Mellon Annual Lecture at the John Hope Franklin 
Humanities Institute at Duke University: National Dreams and Rude Awakenings: The 
American Myths ofisolation and Innocence (Feb. 28, 2003). 
191 See, e.g., Dick Crepeau, Lost and Found, PoPPOLITICS.COM, Oct. l, 2001, www.poppol 
itics.com/articles/2001-10-01-innocence.shtml; Elliot, supra note 189. For a poetic expres-
sion of this idea, see Therese Baumberger, The Death of American Innocence, UNrTAR!AN 
UNIVERSALIST Ass 'N, Sept. 15, 200 l, http:/ /wv.rw .uua.org/news/2002/911 02/pr ayerS .html. 
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and history. The second version is quite unflattering. Is there any other way 
we might meaningfully talk about loss of American innocence? 
Unlike collective America, Americans do lose their innocence, es-
pecially in times of crisis and war. The literature of the Vietnam War, and 
probably the literature of all wars, tells the story of innocence lost and disil-
lusionment.192 In yet another sense, sending our young to fight often leads 
to a loss of innocence. After watching her son, Paul Meadlo, a participant in 
the My Lai massacre, tell his story on the CBS evening news, his mother, 
Myrtle Meadlo, painfully told CBS reporter Ike Pappas: 
He wasn't raised up like that .... I raised him up to be a good boy and I 
did everything I could. They come along and took him to the service. He 
fought for his country and look what they done to him-made a murderer 
fh. . h !93 out o rm, to start w1t . 
Clearly in the wreckage of war, innocence is lost. Yet, that is also not what 
the post-September 11th talk of loss of innocence refers to. 
Rather, our focus seems to be on a new sense of vulnerability, cou-
pled, perhaps, with a strong sense of surprise at the existence of people who 
would do us harm. Here too, this "new" sense is not altogether new. One 
can point to the War of 1812 and the Civil War for instances where the fate 
of the Republic seemed precarious. For many, Pearl Harbor is a memory, 
rather than a page in a history book. Moreover, many of us remember the 
nuclear anxieties of the Cold War, anxieties that run sufficiently deep that 
the Bush Administration played on them successfully in the run up to the 
Iraq War. Nevertheless, there does seem to be a greater sense of vulnerabil-
ity and anxiety. Our loss of innocence is our recognition that we are not 
wholly apart from the world and safe because of the buffer of two oceans. 
While our sense of vulnerability is undoubtedly exaggerated, and at times 
manipulated, it is also part of the current American worldview. 
The question then is what we should do in the face of such anxiety? 
Do we pronounce a new maturity that entails adopting a hard-nosed "gloves 
are off' realism? Do we attempt to recapture our innocence by enveloping 
this supposed realism in a Wilsonian missionary idealism that promises to 
spread democracy throughout the world? Or do we join the world of na-
tions, not as hegemon, but as partner? If we hope to do the latter, we best 
abandon torture, by proxy or otherwise. 
192 See generally APPY, supra note 150. 
193 MICHAEL BILTON & KEVIN SJM, FOUR HOURS IN MY LAJ263 (1992) (quoting Mrs. Myr-
tle Meadlo ). 
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V. CONCLUSION 
To illustrate the concept of the division of labor, Adam Smith de-
scribes in An Inquiry into the Nature and Cause of the Wealth of Nations 
how the process of pin making has changed. 194 In a wonderful passage, he 
describes the various components of pin-making and then calculates the 
efficiencies gained by dividing the job into as many as eighteen different 
tasks. 195 Today, law professors are again talking about pins, or at least nee-
dles, as they muse about non-lethal, but effective means of torture, and sug-
gest sterilized needles, "shoved under the fmgernails," as a possible method 
of torture. 196 To be sure, the connection between the contemporary discus-
sions of permissible torture techniques to Smith's insights on division of 
labor is purely coincidental, not deliberate. Yet the coincidence is frighten-
ingly suggestive of the logic of extraordinary rendition. Torture by proxy, 
however efficient, is still torture, no matter how many steps we remove our-
selves from the interrogation room. 
Extraordinary rendition, though a recent practice, has an old history 
of denial of responsibility and protests of innocence. It is anything but inno-
cent. If there is anything salvageable in the notion of American innocence, 
perhaps it is in the aspiration, rather than in its mechanical assertion. In the 
matter of torture, we might start by returning to Patrick Henry's admonition 
with which this article began, that it is not only our past (or our myths about 
the past) that matter, but what we do today. 
194 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 
4-5 (Random House 1937) (1776). 
195 Jd. 
196 DERSHOWITZ, supra note 48, at 148-49. 
